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## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS PANEL

## WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 12

For week ending 3 August 1948

**\*\* Threats to Palestine truce.** Two weeks after its beginning, the creaky second truce in the Holy Land is under heavy pressure from three sources:--(1) the Mediator's inability to enforce it effectively, owing to inadequate observer forces and no machinery for judging and acting on violations; (2) the increasingly belligerent attitude of Israel, which, conscious of its superior military position and of UN backing, is growing cooler to the demilitarization of Jerusalem and appears to be expanding its territorial ambitions; and (3) the acute Arab refugee problem, which, if not ameliorated at least on a temporary basis, may cause a strong Arab reaction. **\*\*Mediator Bernadotte has protested that he cannot carry out truce enforcement and the demilitarization of Jerusalem without the personnel and equipment requested, including forces to police the city, and has threatened to resign unless his demands are met.\*\***

All of these problems require prompt and effective action by the UN and by the US and the UK, chief interested powers, if any solution is to be found. It is apparently impossible to recruit and train a UN police force for immediate use in Jerusalem, while employment of local Arabs and Jews would be ineffective. Therefore demilitarization may well depend upon the temporary loan of military units by the three Truce Commission powers. Similarly, a stern UN hand may be the only way to force Israel to observe the truce and agree to demilitarization. Since the Mediator's resources to cope with the refugee problem are extremely limited, UN aid here, too, appears necessary. The longer the Mediator is left without means to solve these problems, at least on an ad hoc basis, the more explosive the situation will become and the more likely an overt act by either side may again precipitate open warfare in Palestine.

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**\*\* UN prospects for Berlin dispute.** Syria's action in urging the Big Four to submit the Berlin dispute to the Security Council as a threat to the peace has brought that impasse closer to a hearing in the UN. **\*\*While the case could be brought up in either**

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the General Assembly or the SC, it appears the latter alternative would permit more effective presentation of the western point of view.\*\* Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, all states party to a dispute (in this case four of the permanent members and possibly the Soviet Ukraine) must abstain from voting on any recommended peaceful method of settlement. This procedure does not hold for the stronger measures outlined in Chapter VII. There, Article 40 provides that the SC may call on the parties to take action, deemed necessary to the maintenance of the peace, without prejudicing the "rights, claims or position of the parties concerned". It appears likely that \*\*a majority of nine votes could be mustered in favor of any Council order (such as one to raise the blockade). Although likely to be frustrated by a Soviet veto, such an order would have great moral weight in backing or condoning any subsequent move by the western powers to refer the matter to the GA or to take any self-defense measures before or during its session.\*\*

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European Broadcasting Conference foundering. Soviet insistence upon the acceptance of a frequency allocation plan tailored to its own terms has brought the Copenhagen Broadcasting Conference to a halt. Convened for the purpose of assigning frequencies to all Europe, the conference bogged down over the problem of allocating frequencies to Germany. Soviet delegates insist that the occupying powers receive one program per zone and a single shared frequency for troop broadcasting. While refusing to accept an exact numerical limitation, the majority of the other European Governments, led by the UK and France, have agreed to allocate only "minimum technical means" to each Zone. Such lack of appreciation of US needs and responsibilities in Germany might adversely affect Western Europe as a whole once the US public became aware that US Military Government had been deprived of vital technical facilities at a time when it was spearheading Western resistance to the USSR in Berlin. The voteless US delegation now believes that only strong diplomatic pressure for adjournment sine die can extricate the British and French delegations from this unfortunate position.

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SC returns NEI dispute to GOC. Following an acrimonious debate on the Indonesian Good Offices Committee report, the SC accepted a Chinese resolution urging the two parties to continue working toward a peaceful solution through the GOC. The latter's report criticized Dutch policy in Indonesia, stating Dutch trade

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restrictions amounted to an economic blockade which in essence violated the Renville Agreement, basis of the present discussions.

The GOC, however, remains in a bankrupt position. As stated in its report, unless one side or the other makes concessions, there is no possibility of reaching a solution. To date the Republic has yielded the most, with little being given up by the Dutch. It is possible, however, that two circumstances will break the deadlock:--first, the long-awaited installation of the new Dutch cabinet will enable the Netherlands negotiators to receive policy instructions and second, the presence of new GOC representatives may provide a fresh approach.

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Spanish question likely to be revived. Prospects for the revival of the Spanish issue flourished again with Peru's announcement of a resumption of diplomatic relations with Spain, a move likely to be seconded by other Latin American states. Peru's declaration based action on the fact the 1947 GA did not reaffirm its recommendations of 1946 and the SC had removed the matter from its agenda. The 1947 Spanish resolution was merely a diluted expression of aloofness, but certainly warranted no resumption of relations. Peru's second reason undoubtedly referred to the recent attempt, apparently by the USSR, to place the question on the SC agenda. This effort failed, since there had been no change in the picture to warrant discussion of the case. The 1948 GA, however, will probably witness a violent discussion on Spain since the USSR is unlikely to pass up the propaganda advantages to be derived from another attack on the Franco regime.

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Western European labor consolidates its OEEC role. More vigorous trade union participation in the work of the OEEC was foreshadowed last week in London when delegates to the 15-nation Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC) voted to establish a Paris office to work with OEEC. Through this office, to be headed by Leon Jouhaux, Force Ouvriere chief, the TUAC will direct an aggressive campaign to counteract Communist propaganda and to sabotage the European Recovery Program. This TUAC move, hailed by AFL delegates as providing the nucleus of a Western European-American front against Communist-controlled European labor, has already elicited an attack by the Soviet press which charged American labor with attempting to set up a rival to the World Federation of Trade Unions.

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UK-Poland worried over US coal competition. Both Poland and the UK are concerned over the difficulty of marketing their growing coal export surpluses in Europe and attribute this difficulty largely to the competition of the US. The UK, unable to dispose of 550,000 tons of low quality coal, believes importing countries prefer the higher quality of US coal, and therefore recommends that the US allocate coal to Europe only after full utilization of existing European surpluses. Poland also has suggested this course in the ECX. One difficulty has been the high price of UK and Polish coal, but UK experts feel European price objections may in fact be motivated by a desire to get US coal "free" under the ERP. Both nations have indicated some willingness to deliver coal at less than the US cost.

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TC considers brakes on USSR obstructionism. UN Trusteeship Council delegates, conducting the first annual review of reports from administering trust powers, may apply brakes to the so-far-successful Soviet efforts to exploit the Council as a forum for propaganda on colonial issues. A greatly disproportionate amount of time has been taken up by propagandistic questions and comments by the Soviet representative. US delegate Sayre consequently asked how the TC, which considered only three reports this session, can be expected to examine and report to the GA on six or seven at the next session. Proposals have been made for reducing the time for questioning special representatives of the administering powers. To obtain majority support for such limitation may prove difficult, however, since Soviet attacks have increasingly tended to split the TC into two voting blocs (administering and non-administering powers) and any proposals limiting the right to question the special representatives would probably be opposed by all of the non-administering powers.

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Substantial IRO aid for Arab refugees unlikely. US and UN officials concerned with refugee problems claim that while the International Refugee Organization may assist any eligible refugees, irrespective of location, its limited budget would probably preclude effective aid to the Arab refugees in the Middle East. Meanwhile the UK SC appeal for Arab refugee aid was tossed back to the Palestine Mediator and the problem remains, as hitherto, unsolved.

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